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Abstract
Comparatively slow in adopting any clear activation strategy, post- 
crisis Ireland crossed the Rubicon and rapidly took steps to implement a 
work-first labour activation strategy. The article maps and examines the 
interaction of three variables – ideational influences, political interests 
and institutional processes – to assess the nature of post-crisis Irish acti-
vation policy. Troika imposition of aid conditionality, the ideational role 
of the OECD and domestic elites worked to shift the focus of Irish acti-
vation policy and its implementation. Post-crisis Irish activation is less 
influenced by social democratic versions of high-road activation than 
neo-liberal managerial stock management and conservative behavioural 
controls. These converge into a low-road model of activation. There is 
some demand for, but little articulation of, an alternative policy that 
could be centred around less conditionality and more focus on demand-
side issues including low pay, quality work, distribution of employment 
and removal of barriers to employment.
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Introduction
Ireland is rarely considered for the study of activation or broader compara-
tive welfare regime analysis. However, the severity of the Irish crisis makes it 
an ideal and timely test case for posing the general question as to how crisis 
impacts on activation regimes. Pre-crisis Ireland was an exemplar competi-
tion state that subordinated social policy to the imperatives of international 
competition (Kirby and Murphy, 2011). Given Ireland’s traditionally low 
welfare effort and significant level of market provision of welfare we might 
have expected Ireland to be a leader in work-first type activation that com-
modifies non-employed people and makes them reliant on the market. How-
ever, this was not the case. Ireland is generally regarded as an outlier with 
an underdeveloped activation practice relative to other liberal states or the 
European Union (EU) norm (NESC, 2011).
Martin (2014) observed how crisis in Europe triggered a new wave of 
reforms including curtailment of benefits and/or activation services to mini-
mum income recipients (Portugal, Netherlands, Czech Republic) and, in paral-
lel, a further deepening of the focus on work-conditionality (UK and Norway). 
This article examines whether and how crisis was used as an opportunity to 
converge Irish activation with European norms. We begin by briefly contextu-
alising the Irish crisis. The next section locates the article in critical political 
economy approaches that understand activation as a way of managing the social 
and political reality of unemployment in neo-liberal political economies. We 
then introduce a theoretical framework that explains change as the interaction 
of three variables – institutional processes, political interests and ideational 
influences – and specifically examine literature theorising Europeanisation and 
international influences. We apply this framework to explain the post-crisis 
trajectory of Irish activation policy by first sketching the broad institutional 
framework guiding such policy, and then introducing the key interests who 
shaped this policy. We then analyse recent policy changes under three broad 
ideational frameworks – neo-liberal, conservative and social democratic. The 
conclusion focuses on how the Troika imposition of aid conditionality and the 
ideational role of the OECD interacted with domestic elites to shift the focus 
of Irish activation policy and ensure its speedy implementation. The departure 
of the Troika makes domestic politics and tensions more visible. It remains to 
be seen how the confluence of international drivers and post-2016 domestic 
electoral and social politics will influence Irish activation policy.
Crisis
Clasen et  al. (2012) argue that the crisis triggered three different types 
of labour market responses across Europe: demand shock, fiscal emergency 
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and structural reform. From 2007 Ireland experienced three stages of cri-
sis: the early-crisis period 2008–2010, the mid-crisis or Troika period of 
2011–2014 and the late-crisis or post-Troika period 2014–present. Despite 
recent economic growth and reducing unemployment, Ireland has not nec-
essarily entered a post-crisis period; rather the terms of the EU Stability 
and Growth Pact suggest a period of permanent austerity. Ireland proved 
particularly vulnerable to the impact of the international financial crisis in 
2007/8. Indigenous factors such as over-reliance on property-related fiscal 
policies, poorly regulated bank lending practices and an ill-judged 2008 
guarantee to bail out Irish banks increased Irish sovereign debt to unsus-
tainable levels. November 2010 saw the loss of Irish sovereignty to the 
European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (the Troika) whose bailout package included a Memo of Understand-
ing (MOU) to underpin an €85 billion loan (Ireland, 2010). This MOU 
has been described as a blueprint for intensification of liberalisation of the 
economy (Hardiman and Regan, 2012).
Ireland’s financial crisis also meant an economic and fiscal crisis. Seven 
years of austerity budgets saw €30 billion of fiscal consolidation with a 2:1 
ratio of expenditure cuts over revenue gathering and significant social impacts. 
Over the ‘Celtic Tiger’ decade of high economic growth (1996–2006), previ-
ously high unemployment dropped steadily to a low of 4.1 per cent in 2000. 
The crisis had immediate economic impact with a loss of over 300,000 jobs. 
Unemployment increased from 4.4 per cent in 2008 to a high of 15.1 per 
cent in 2012. More recently it has fallen to its present level of 8.8 per cent 
in December 2015, 54 per cent of whom are long-term unemployed. This 
level of post-crisis unemployment does not include over 85,000 on Active 
Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs), 115,500 underemployed workers and 
the 70,000+ per annum who emigrated over 2011–2014 (Figure 1) (CSO, 
2014, 2015; NERI, 2015).
Pre-crisis, the basic features of the Irish welfare state were largely consis-
tent with liberal welfare regimes albeit Ireland had a more generous level of 
welfare payment, a relatively high level of investment in ALMPs, and less use 
of sanctions and conditionality than the UK or other liberal regimes (NESC, 
2011). Grubb et al.’s (2009) OECD review of pre-crisis activation likened 
Ireland to an ‘emperor who had no clothes’ with much lip-service paid to 
activation principles but little implementation (Martin, 2014). While Ire-
land in 2010 had above average public spending on ALMPs (1 per cent of 
GDP compared with an OECD average of 0.65 per cent), there was little 
engagement with Public Employment Service (PES) clients; rather ‘the Irish 
authorities left the unemployed to their own devices’ (Martin, 2014: 16). 
The pre-crisis Irish activation strategy, the National Employment Action 
Plan (NEAP), was a requirement of the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) and generally regarded as lack-
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lustre with little or even negative impact on employment outcomes (Forfás, 
2010; McGuinness et al., 2011). Entering crisis, Ireland appeared to stand 
on the fulcrum of a seesaw, straddling the low road and the high road (NESC, 
2011). Post-crisis, Ireland made a definitive policy choice and rapidly took 
significant steps to implement a new national activation strategy laid out in 
Pathways to Work (DSP, 2011) and a Youth Guarantee (DSP, 2014a). The 
key question for this article is how domestic and international ideas, inter-
ests and institutions interacted to construct this policy shift and ensure its 
implementation.
Activation
This section locates the article in critical debates in the wider activation lit-
erature. Brodkin (2013) identifies a ‘global workfare project’ which comes 
under different labels including welfare-to-work, welfare reform, labour mar-
ket activation, jobseeker allowance and revenu minimum d’insertion; all incorpo-
rate promoting participation in the labour market and reducing cash benefits. 
While many use the language of activation and workfare interchangeably, 
Lødemel and Moreria (2014) differentiate workfare (compulsory participation 
in paid employment) from activation (compulsory participation in other forms 
Figure 1. Net migration for Ireland 2004–2014.
Source: CSO, 2014.
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of ALMPs including education, training, occupation, job search). While acti-
vation can be understood as a specific programme, it is better understood as a 
wider policy strategy of ‘designing benefit rules and employment or training 
services with a view to moving unemployment income benefit recipients into 
work, and involving a wide range of interventions including fiscal policy, 
public services and education or training’ (Lødemel and Moreria, 2014: 9). 
Bonoli (2013) outlines the long history of activation which originally focused 
on enabling active labour market programmes and regulating the job-search 
behaviour of the unemployed. By the mid 2000s the OECD and European 
Employment Guidelines approach to activation had widened to encompass 
‘interactions between income systems, ALMPs and benefit conditionality, as 
well as proactive management of employment services to effectively promote 
and assist the return to work’ (Martin, 2014: 7).
Contemporary approaches to activation developed in the context of 
managing the politics of unemployment and the cost of social assistance in 
neo-liberal economies. As social policy became subordinated to economic 
imperatives, governments focused on ways to limit social assistance and man-
age the conduct of the unemployed through a range of enabling, regulatory 
and compensating packages (Brodkin and Marston, 2013). Two approaches 
dominate: work obligations as a condition for receiving minimum income 
benefits; investment in active labour market policies (ALMPs) or in-work 
benefits to assist recipients’ return to the labour market. Early typologies 
of activation regimes often distinguished a European focus on human capi-
tal and decent work from a work-first US approach dominated by promot-
ing self-reliance through paid employment. Later analysis differentiates less 
between the US and Europe. Both now focus on work and stress financial 
incentives to work, integration of benefit and employment services, and 
delivery or governance mechanisms associated with privatisation or marke-
tisation.
Grover (2009) understands activation as part of the broader shift 
towards neo-liberal governance where social policy is subordinated to eco-
nomic competitiveness. Privatisation, by giving non-employed people an 
economic value, commodifies people with a view to supplying capital with 
suitably willing workers. Following Peck and Theodore (2000) he stresses 
how unemployment is managed through ‘supply-side fundamentalism’ 
which goes beyond ‘employability’, to construct a scenario where unem-
ployment is caused by unemployed people, where demand is ignored and 
where activation works to push downward pressure on wages. Darmon and 
Perez (2010: 84) associate activation with the recommodification of labour 
and capital’s demand for new forms of ‘floating’ or more portable and flex-
ible employees. Bengtsson (2014) uses ‘standby-ability’ to describe simi-
lar processes in Sweden and Demark while, in Ireland, Murphy and Loftus 
(2015) describe flex-insecurity and O’Sullivan et al. (2015) use the term ‘if 
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and when’ to describe the reality of employment scheduling for precarious 
workers in Ireland.
Privatisation of employment services also shifts power and enables soft 
convergence through managerial reforms that undermine potentially enabling 
elements and intensify regulatory or punitive elements (Brodkin and Mar-
ston, 2013). This shift to market-led governance has led to more systemic 
co-ordination, collaboration and decentralisation (Heidenreich and Graziano, 
2014), as well as increased marketisation of employment services and pro-
cesses of individualisation, targeting, tailoring and one-to-one contracts or 
personal plans (Lødemel and Moreria, 2014). Not all countries have proceeded 
at the same pace; Van Berkel et al. (2012) differentiated modernisers, slow 
modernisers and committed marketisers. Despite recent reforms and engage-
ment with employment services marketisation processes (Wiggan, 2015: 
151), Ireland can be characterised, alongside Italy and the Czech Republic, as 
a slow moderniser.
Theoretical framework
New institutional scholarship (Hall and Taylor, 1996) combines culture or 
ideas, institutions and interests as approaches to explain regime change or 
stasis. Hay’s (2004) approach avoids privileging one of these factors over 
others; rather he uses a three-dimensional framework to understand the pro-
cess of change or stasis as the interaction of ideas, institutions and interests. 
Theoretical insights from studies of activation enable deeper understand-
ing of recent Irish change. Ingold and Etherington (2014: 621) stress the 
importance of the diffusion of ideas (causal claims, beliefs and assumptions) 
articulated by policy actors as crucial to both the construction and deliv-
ery of activation policies. Van Gerven et  al. (2014) examine ‘European-
isation’ understood as domestic change caused by two types of European 
integration: (i) the European Employment Strategy (EES) which influences 
through peer review, mutual learning, targets, annual reporting and (ii) 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) framework which influences 
through fiscal targets that encourage lower tax burdens and cuts in social 
expenditures. Crucially, as Armingeon (2007) argues, both dimensions are 
mediated through domestic political actors and conditioned by local labour 
market institutions. Van Gerven et  al. (2014: 524) hypothesise that key 
Europeanisation mechanisms – leverage, learning and aid conditionality – 
have greater impact in unitary centralised states. For De la Porte and Pochet 
(2012), the impact of Europeanisation also depends on which ministries 
participate in national peer review and whether unions, as social partners, 
participate meaningfully in such processes. Clearly, domestic actors and 
institutions filter international influence.
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Ireland, as a small centralised state, appears an ideal candidate for a high 
level of Europeanisation but pre-crisis this influence did not translate into a 
significant activation policy or its implementation. Using the framework of 
the interaction of institutions, interests and ideas to understand the trajectory 
of post-crisis Irish activation we explain the recent shift towards activation in 
the context of ‘aid conditionality’. We argue the Troika period opened up the 
ideational significance of the OECD in a context where the Troika presence 
also mitigated previously strong policy inertia and domestic implementation 
vetoes. The Troika influence appears to have been to drive through the veto 
culture which might otherwise have sunk this long anticipated reform agenda 
(Murphy, 2012b). Troika targets and monitoring schedules challenged the 
Irish tendency towards ‘implementation deficit disorder’ (Kirby and Murphy, 
2011: 62), and Troika presence ensured a fuller implementation at a faster 
pace than would have otherwise been the case. To illustrate this argument the 
following three sections use this framework of institutions, interests and ideas 
to map and analyse the trajectory of Irish activation during the crisis.
Institutions
One impact of the crisis is that power is now more centralised in the Irish 
political system (Kirby and Murphy, 2011). While, post-crisis, there had 
been some initiatives to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny, Troika institu-
tional arrangements further centralised the process of policy making (Hardi-
man and Regan, 2012: 9). New domestic institutions included a ministry 
for Public Expenditure and Reform, and an Economic Management Coun-
cil, comprising the four most senior government ministers (Taoiseach (Prime 
Minister), Tánaiste (deputy Prime Minister), Finance, and Public Expendi-
ture and Reform). Collectively these consolidated fiscal and policy control at 
the centre of government.
Tsebelis (2002: 209) differentiates states according to institutional char-
acteristics that give rise to ‘veto points’. Some political systems ‘are prone to 
crisis-engendered institutional change’, others are characterised by ‘incremen-
tal reformism’ (Hay, 2004: 205). Multiple veto players lead to policy cultures 
dominated by policy avoidance, a consensus culture and a more conservative 
policy predisposition. The Irish electoral system combines with other veto 
points including a rigid constitution, a two-chamber parliament, coalition 
governments and social partnership to orient Irish political culture and policy 
making in a direction that makes path dependence more likely. This contrib-
uted to the previous slow pace of activation reform (Murphy, 2012b). Early-
crisis reforms included removal of one key institutional veto point, social 
partnership, while the presence of the Troika and centralisation of power 
diluted the impact of other veto points, notably parliamentary opposition. 
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Austerity cuts also weakened or closed down key national equality and human 
rights institutions and many local community organisations; these losses miti-
gated resistance to activation reforms (Harvey, 2014).
In the early-crisis period, the pressure of rocketing unemployment 
prompted short-term emergency responses, welfare cuts and little institu-
tional reform. ALMP spending per unemployed person reduced as unemploy-
ment rose and strong pressures for fiscal consolidation caused public spending 
reductions (Martin, 2014: 12). In 2011, under direction of the Troika MOU, 
the newly elected government committed in the Programme for Government 
(Ireland, 2011b) to develop and implement a new activation strategy that 
had been previously outlined in the previous government’s National Recov-
ery Plan for 2011–2014 (Ireland, 2011a). The activation strategy Pathways to 
Work (DSP, 2011) focused on five key action points: more regular and ongo-
ing engagement with non-employed people; greater targeting of activation; 
incentivising the take-up of opportunities; incentivising employers to recruit 
the unemployed; reforming institutions to deliver better services. This has 
been updated annually (DSP, 2014b; Oireachtas, 2015). The first major mid-
crisis institutional reform in 2011 was to merge personnel from FÁS (the pre-
crisis Irish National Training and Employment Authority) and the Health 
Service Executive into the Department of Social Protection (DSP). This uni-
fied benefit administration and public employment services into Intreo, a ‘one-
stop-shop model’ launched in 2012. Intreo reached an ambitious 2014 target 
of 60 new offices (Labour Market Council, 2014: 13). Merging these institu-
tions doubled PES institutional capacity. However, the Employment Services 
Officer:Claimant ratio remained high by international standards and serious 
capacity gaps remained (NESC, 2011). In October 2014 DSP contracted two 
private sector companies to provide employment services to Ireland’s long-
term unemployed through a new pay-by-results activation programme, ‘Job-
Path’, which became operational in 2015. In parallel large-scale institutional 
reforms, a new national training agency ‘Solas’ was established in 2013 and 
sixteen regional Education and Training Boards were created by merging 
local authority Vocational Educational Committees and local FÁS Training 
Centres. The scale of this unprecedented institutional reform was unlikely to 
have been achieved without the presence of the Troika.
Interests
Partisan politics is a crucial factor determining variation in governments’ 
responses to crisis (Huber and Stephens, 2001). Pre-crisis domestic interests 
had been relatively passive and unambitious in relation to activation – shifts 
in domestic political power had had little impact on the trajectory of Irish 
activation. The Troika disturbed previously strong policy inertia and domestic 
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implementation vetoes. From 2008 to 2011, the incumbent centre-right and 
populist Fianna Fail (FF)/Green Party (GP) coalition responded to the early-
crisis period without any significant institutional reforms or ambition. This 
was in spite of negative evaluations of the previous Irish activation strategy 
(Harmon et al., 2012; McGuinness et al., 2011), and a major corporate gov-
ernance scandal in FÁS. This is consistent with historical political protection 
of FÁS by FF and the social partners (Boyle, 2005). Meanwhile, even in the 
context of significant emigration, the crisis saw unemployment increase from 
4 per cent in 2008 to 15 per cent in 2010 and PES were clearly unable to meet 
growing demand. In 2010, under pressure, the FF/GP government commit-
ted to reform labour market institutions as a key horizontal measure of their 
National Recovery Plan for 2011–2014 (Ireland, 2011a). This reform agenda 
mirrored OECD (Grubb et al., 2009) recommendations for activation. The 
plan was subsequently consolidated and reinforced with targets and time-
tables in the Troika MOU (Ireland, 2010). The practical pressure for reform 
combined with the presence of the Troika shifted previous vetoes, obstacles 
and overall indifference to reform.
Activation was not a burning issue in the February 2011 general elec-
tion, nor a negotiation barrier in the subsequent coalition formation process. 
A new government took power in March 2011 with Fine Gael (FG) firmly 
in the driving seat of a Christian/Social Democrat coalition with the Labour 
Party (LP). The politics of the welfare state often emerges through hidden 
institutional struggles in the state bureaucracy (Hacker, 2004). While the 
central social protection and education portfolios were held by social demo-
cratic ministers, these ministries were not at the centre of power. The work-
first activation model appears partially driven by the Labour Market Council, 
which meets in the Department of an Taoiseach and is chaired and popu-
lated by private enterprise. Inward recruitment from the private sector, to 
the most senior position of Intreo, is consistent with a more managerial culture 
(Brodkin, 2013). The 2014 privatisation of some PES is likely to shape future 
policy and implementation and lessen the remaining influence of trade unions 
(Lipsky, 2013). The LP presence contributed to the partial defence of some 
vital economic floors, including the minimum wage and informed the choice 
of the Irish JobPath privatisation model (Wiggan, 2015: 162). Confidence in 
the social democratic presence in government may have neutralised or miti-
gated some natural opposition to some reforms.
Late-crisis, and facing a general election in 2016, Irish citizens are elec-
torally volatile: significant numbers of voters are ‘undecided’ and many are 
turning away from mainstream parties to independents, left alternatives or 
seeking new political parties. Activation policy featured in the 2014 EU elec-
tion campaign in the form of LP campaigns for a Youth Guarantee and Social-
ist Party campaigns against the JobBridge labour market internship programme 
(Scambridge, 2014). The winding down of social partnership has left some 
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trade union interests weakened by the loss of associated policy mechanisms; 
however, they retain some institutional and campaigning capacity to influence 
activation, as does civil society. On the other hand international and domestic 
business interests are increasingly visible and vocal. Media interests maintain 
a dominant neo-liberal frame in commenting on the crisis (Mercille, 2014) 
and also engage in a socially constructed fraud discourse that differentiates the 
welfare-dependent population from the taxpaying population (NESC, 2011).
Policy making has thus become a more elite process. Opponents who 
might develop political coalitions against ‘work-first activation’ have been 
weakened, politically excluded and their advocacy has been limited by new 
funding regimes (Harvey, 2014). Groups most impacted by activation are 
electorally weak but have built active coalitions and found some political 
voice. Young people have campaigned against internships and precarious work 
through ‘We’re Not Leaving’ (2014). Lone parents in the Seven is too Young cam-
paign partially resisted welfare conditionality for lone parents whose youngest 
child is aged seven or over, restricting full conditionality to lone parents whose 
youngest child is 14 or over (Murphy and Loftus, 2015). Trade unions have 
primarily focused on presenting members’ interests in the context of public 
sector mergers. However, alongside non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
they also publically opposed or critiqued various ALMPs (including JobBridge, 
Gateway and TUS) but have had little impact on policy. Despite considerable 
disquiet on the ground, there was limited meaningful contestation of Irish 
activation policy in the 2015 government-initiated National Economic Dia-
logue or the October 2015 Pathways to Work consultation process. With excep-
tions (Boland and Griffin, 2015; EAPN Ireland, 2015; INOU, 2015; Murphy 
and Loftus, 2015) there has been little critical focus on the sanctions regime or 
notable campaigns against Pathways to Work.
Ideational
Table 1 outlines key ideological systems that inform approaches to activation. 
The table suggests a neo-liberal frame might accommodate low pay, privatisa-
tion and new managerialism, a conservative frame might stress the imperative 
of control including fiscal, fraud and behavioural or social regulation, and a 
social democratic frame might champion full employment, equality and decent 
work. Our interest is in which frames dominate and why. In the mid to late cri-
sis period we expect a strong neo-liberal frame from international actors includ-
ing the EU and OECD, but also ideational framing influenced by a Christian 
Democratic dominated government (FG) as well as some counter-balancing 
social democratic framing from the minor social democrat coalition partner 
(LP). Before examining the ideological orientation of Irish activation policy we 
first explore the international ideational sources for Irish activation policy.
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While the practical influence of the Troika and the ideational influence 
of the OECD are crucial variables influencing change, it is important not 
to underplay the role of domestic elites or overlook the mutual interaction 
between the domestic and international ideational processes. Domestic pol-
icy actors actively translate international ideas and ideologies into domestic 
activation policy and discourse, filtering and selectively amplifying different 
aspects of policy (Murphy, 2012a). The standing down of domestic social 
partnership diminished the role of various domestic cognitive institutions 
and lessened the influence of traditional indigenous ideational sources. The 
recent lack of impact of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
on activation policy can be contrasted with the role NESC played in fram-
ing responses in the 1980s crisis (Ireland, 1987; NESC, 1986, 2011). The 
National Economic and Social Forum, an indigenous labour market policy 
entrepreneur in the 1990s (NESF, 1994) was an early casualty of the crisis. 
Other rights and equality ideational champions were badly damaged over the 
crisis (Harvey, 2014).
Pre-crisis, the cognitive influences of the EES were only loosely trans-
lated into the NEAP and the historical impact of Europeanisation was not as 
great as might have been expected (Murphy, 2012b; Van Vliet and Koster, 
2008). During the crisis, both domestic politics and international ideational 
actors influenced activation policy. Troika and OECD influence overlapped 
and Europeanisation is clearly evident. Irish euro membership shaped mac-
roeconomic parameters and determined Irish responses to the crisis and this 
informed the context in which the Troika MOU became the blueprint for 
managing the crisis. Policy transfer is a complex process, especially in the 
context of path dependency. International ideational actors are evident in key 
policy documents. OECD policy entrepreneurs Grubb et al. (2009), Martin 
(2010) and Gonzalez Pandiella (2013) and UK policy consultant Finn (2011) 
all left policy footprints; US and Australian models also influenced key pro-
posals (DSP, 2011, 2014b). However, interaction between the domestic and 
international is two-way. The Troika MOU activation blueprint reflected the 
recommendations of the Irish government-commissioned OECD review of 
Irish activation (Grubb et al., 2009); crucially this had also influenced the 
indigenous National Recovery Plan for 2011–2014 (Ireland, 2011a). While 
the EU shaped the new Youth Guarantee, the 2013 Irish presidency shaped 
Table 1. Indicators of ideological influences.
Ideology/indicator 1 2 3
Neo-liberal Low wages Privatisation New Public Managerialism
Conservative Fiscal control Fraud control Behavioural control
Social Democratic Full employment Equality Decent work
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EU policy on the Youth Guarantee. Finer details of the Youth Guarantee 
(DSP, 2014a) were in turn shaped by an Irish government-commissioned 
report from the OECD (2014). We proceed to unpack the framework in Table 
1 to examine which international and domestic ideas dominated and steered 
recent Irish activation policy choices and outcomes.
Low pay has long been a feature of the Irish economy. However, wages 
have declined over the crisis and precarious working conditions have intensi-
fied (Murphy and Loftus, 2015; NERI, 2015; O’Sullivan et al., 2015). The 
work-first Irish activation model accepts low pay as the starting point for acti-
vation. Policy reinforces the sustainability of low-paid jobs by commodifying 
and pressuring people to accept such jobs and by making available in-work 
benefits to top up low wages. Policy assumes that any job has better conse-
quences than unemployment even if this is contradicted by evidence that pre-
carious work can impact negatively on mental and physical health. Boland and 
Griffin (2015: 15) describe a ‘harsh, unsympathetic and authoritarian’ policy 
– which ultimately ‘makes people accept work at lower wages or in worse 
conditions … guaranteeing employers a ready pool of labour and alleviating 
pressure on employers to offer good conditions or competitive wages’ – an 
outcome they describe as ‘unjust and morally repugnant’ (p. 22). 30.3 per 
cent of Irish employees (400,000 workers) lie below the low pay threshold of 
€12.20 per hour, with women representing 60 per cent of all those who are 
low paid (NERI, 2015). 87 per cent of the low paid are in the private sector, 
with one-quarter in the wholesale and retail sector and almost one in six in the 
accommodation and food sector. Reflecting campaigns against low pay, fol-
lowing recommendations by a Low Pay Commission (LPC) established in late 
2014, the Irish minimum wage will increase from the pre-crisis rate of €8.65 
per hour to €9.15 per hour in 2016 (LPC, 2015). The LPC has also signalled 
intent to reform labour protections to protect against exploitative ‘if and when’ 
contracts, the Irish version of zero-hour contracts (O’Sullivan et al., 2015).
New Public Management culture and practice is now a dominant fea-
ture of Irish activation and guides its implementation. The use of profiling 
tools to determine PEX (Probability of Exit) means less discretion, more 
automated decision processes and less room for building trust in claimant–
mediator relationships. Information technology-driven bureaucratic processes 
control the process of client engagement; form filling and administration take 
proportionally more of the workers’ time and institutional needs increasingly 
dominate the mediation process (Creedon, 2014). Consistent with activation 
practice elsewhere, managerialism shifts power at street level (Lipsky, 2013). 
The privatisation process will contribute to what Brodkin (2015: 6) describes 
as a culture of ‘meeting the numbers’, where staff workloads become domi-
nated by targets and key performance indicators (Lowe, 2015).
Privatisation is a common feature of neo-liberal practice. PES capacity 
and skill deficits had been a feature of the 1980s crisis but the challenge was 
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met through investing in not-for-profit NGOs in a new Local Employment 
Service (NESF, 1994). With public expenditure constrained by the terms of 
the 2011 Fiscal Treaty, the Irish state this time addressed PES capacity and 
skills deficits through privatisation of employment services for the long-term 
unemployed. While partially motivated by the need to address genuine short- 
to medium-term temporary capacity issues, there is also a strong ideological 
orientation to privatisation amongst key domestic actors including advisors in 
the Taoiseach’s policy unit. Under Pathways to Work (DSP, 2014b) in October 
2014 the DSP, following a tendering process supported by the London-based 
Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion, contracted two private companies 
to deliver JobPath. These will in turn subcontract local and specialised Irish 
NGOs. This new activation programme for Ireland’s long-term unemployed 
will have significant implications. Statutory agencies (and unionised work-
ers) are more likely to resist punitive behavioural sanctions and less likely to 
have work performance patterned by metrics. Private agencies paid by results 
are more likely to control and manipulate claimants and outcomes (Brodkin, 
2013; Wiggan, 2015). The Irish model of privatisation relies less on the pri-
macy of market rationality and has more regulation of standards and modera-
tion of provider empowerment than the British model (Lowe, 2015). Wiggan 
(2015: 162) attributes this to LP presence in the social protection ministry 
and their ‘core preference for protecting equity and retaining state involve-
ment in welfare provision’.
Fiscal controls now dominate public policy in Ireland. The combina-
tion of Troika reporting schedules and European Semester fiscal treaty defi-
cit reduction targets steers and controls Irish budgetary policy. A traditional 
focus on expenditure control is now intensified in the Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform’s focus on value for money. The politics of activa-
tion also plays out between political and bureaucratic powers in government 
departments: fiscal targets mean the senior civil service manager’s power is 
enhanced. The presence of penalties and sanctions is also related to fiscal con-
trol. Even the presence of sanctions reduces the claimant count (Finn, 2011) 
and it is difficult to separate political imperative to reduce unemployment 
from the drive to control costs and manage budgets. The latent fiscal function 
of sanctions is as important as the more manifest labour market behavioural 
functions (Brodkin, 2013).
Fraud control overlaps with behavioural and fiscal control agendas. The 
fraud control agenda is directly linked to expenditure controls in that fraud 
savings targets are directly built into government budgetary targets. Like-
wise, there is significant overlap with the narratives of behavioural and fraud 
control. These combine to create a climate of distrust in social welfare recipi-
ents (Boland and Griffin, 2015). Two activation programmes, TUS and Gate-
way, embed fraud control in the activation processes targeting a particular 
cohort of the long-term unemployed considered at high risk of fraud and offer 
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activation programmes with the primary objective of mitigating fraud. The 
quasi-activation process is managed by a senior civil servant who has a parallel 
fraud control role in the DSP. Language matters in public discourse and can 
valorise some citizens over others (Abowitz and Hannish, 2006). Irish policy 
discourse increasingly uses managerial or conservative discourse reflecting a 
moral undertone about joblessness, welfare dependency and lifestyle choices 
and an alarmist and disproportionate fraud discourse (NESC, 2011).
Behavioural controls are a relatively new focus of Irish activation pol-
icy which was previously characterised by a supportive and sensitive rhetoric 
(NESC, 2011) reflecting successive Irish governments’ reluctance to apply 
benefit sanctions to job seekers (Grubb et  al., 2009). Over 2011 to 2015 
legal reforms targeted new penalties towards unemployed job seekers, lone 
parents and young people. The Social Welfare Act 2010 provided that, from 
April 2011, payment can be reduced by €44 per week if an adult job seeker 
refuses an appropriate offer of training, declines an intervention, does not 
attend meetings, or drops out of the process. From July 2013 those on the 
penalty rate of €144 for 21 days or more can be disqualified from receiving 
job seeker payments for up to nine weeks, or in extreme cases receive a total 
ban. From July 2015 job seekers are penalised for failure to upload a CV on 
a government website. Due to pressure to report to the Troika, the number 
of penalties rose considerably: from March to December 2011 there were 359 
penalties issued, in 2012 the number of penalties rose to 1,500, in 2013 pen-
alties increased to 3,500 and 2014 saw 6,500 penalties issued.
It is not clear how this new sanctions regime will embed in a culture that 
has traditionally resisted the application of sanctions (Martin, 2014). While 
only a relatively low 1 per cent of the job seeker population so far has received 
penalties, it is impossible to gauge whether this might increase in future years. 
There is evidence that sanctions are unpopular and their use is mitigated in 
practice by many PES staff. However, Lowe (2015) observes that JobPath’s 
pay-by-results regime requires staff to wield the sanctions stick effectively in 
order to ensure that clients search for work effectively. In 2017 JobPath will 
also apply conditionality to people in part-time employment and in receipt of 
in-work benefits. Young people are required to have a higher level of engage-
ment and commitment with PES, and the roll-out of the Youth Guarantee 
will likely increase sanctions for young people under 25. It is also notable that 
Ireland has not yet achieved a ‘triple integration’ where activation sits along-
side ‘unemployment support homogenisation’ and ‘unemployment policy 
co-ordination’ (Clasen and Clegg, 2011). In 2010 DSP proposed unemploy-
ment support homogenisation in the form of a Single Working Age Payment 
where labour market conditionality would be applied, on the same basis as 
for unemployment payments, to lone parents, partners/spouses, people with 
disabilities and carers (Martin, 2011). Most of these proposals were quietly 
shelved, although in 2015 government proceeded with a new sanction regime 
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for lone parents whose youngest child is 14 years of age or older (Murphy and 
Loftus, 2015), and a growth led activation strategy will likely expand sanctions 
to other groups.
Full employment: high levels of labour market participation are a social 
democratic imperative and are an underlying objective of Nordic high-road 
activation policy which aims to both lower unemployment and achieve full 
employment. From 2007 to 2013 ‘economic inactivity’ rose from 27.5 per cent 
to 30.5 per cent (NERI, 2015) and the 2013 employment rate of 65.5 per cent 
is below the European Union and Eurozone average of 68.4 per cent. Taking 
into account 139,300 underemployed workers, 23.5 per cent of the Irish labour 
force were either unemployed or underemployed in Q3 2013 (O’Farrell, 2013). 
Low pay is clearly related to low hours of work, part-time work and temporary 
contracts or more general precarious working conditions; the in-work pov-
erty rate for part-time workers is more than twice that for full-time workers 
and much male part-time employment is involuntary. The labour market and 
related activation policy remain gendered. Along with Spain, the Netherlands 
and the UK, Ireland’s historic ‘male bread-winner state has continued into the 
activation age’ with little investment in childcare (Rice, 2015:190).
Decent jobs are a hallmark of social democratic activation. Post-crisis 
government dismantled labour legislation and decreased minimum wages. 
Since 2011 some of these changes including the minimum wage cut were 
restored. Nonetheless, the Irish labour market is relatively precarious with 
very flexible hiring and firing practices leading to a condition of flex-insecu-
rity for Ireland’s vulnerable workforce, particularly women, young people and 
migrants (Murphy and Loftus, 2015; O’Sullivan et al., 2015). The propor-
tion of men working part-time more than doubled from its pre-crisis level 
of 7.1 per cent in Q4 2006, to 16.8 per cent by Q4 2012, while the propor-
tion of women working part-time has increased from an already high level of 
31.1 per cent to 35.8 per cent over the same period (NERI, 2015). Full-time 
employment had steadily declined, from 70 per cent working 35 hours or 
more in 2001, to just 60 per cent in 2011. However, it is noticeable that in 
2015 the labour market experienced significant full-time job growth with a 
related decline in the number of part-time jobs (CSO, 2015).
Equality is a core social democratic value as is the concept of an inclusive 
labour market but Pathways to Work is notable for its lack of consideration 
of equality (INOU, 2015). The activation strategy does little to address the 
barriers to work for people with disabilities. Ireland maintains an absolute 
ban on asylum seekers working. EAPN Ireland (2015: 1) critiqued the Irish 
model of activation and stressed the need to support people to live in dig-
nity and participate in society, whether in or out of work. Rice (2015) ques-
tions the degree to which activation can transform pre-existing structures of 
socio-economic equality. Without reforming the structure and quality of jobs 
and addressing childcare, women will be activated into a male labour market 
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(Murphy and Loftus, 2015). While in 2015, on the one hand, the LPC is 
examining mechanisms to address the disproportionate number of women in 
low-paid employment, on the other hand, since July 2015 lone parents, once 
their youngest child is 14, are subject to activation into full-time jobs and 
with reduced in-work benefits.
Conclusion
What and who are driving Irish activation policy? The political momentum 
behind this ‘work-first’ activation model and the control, managerial and 
privatisation agendas informing its practical delivery include both domestic 
and international drivers. The OECD provided the blueprint that was medi-
ated into Irish policy through domestic elites. Martin (2014: 17) is clear that 
the ‘radical’ shift in Irish activation policy was formulated in Grubb et al.’s 
(2009) OECD review of Irish activation and adopted by domestic policy 
actors before it was subsequently written into the Troika programme. How-
ever, the Troika programme was crucial to its implementation. The support 
and conditionality framework in the MOU required a schedule of reform of 
the benefits system to create greater incentives to take up employment and 
to tighten eligibility and means-test criteria (Hardiman and Regan, 2012: 
12). The revised versions of the MOU stressed implementation with clear 
targets for PES institutional reform alongside a quarterly reporting system for 
implementing an enhanced sanctions regime. The Troika’s presence was cru-
cial. They determined the speed of the reform agenda even if some policy and 
implementation mechanisms were the choice of the government (Weymes, 
2012: 8). The presence of the Troika also provided the political imperative to 
remove vetoes and ensure that the implementation proceeded without derail-
ment. The OECD/Troika MOU influence has been stronger than previous 
cognitive Europeanisation processes associated with the EES and OMC. Post-
crisis, euro members are now governed through the European Semester pro-
cess. Country-specific recommendations on labour market policy will likely 
intensify the influence of European governance processes.
The impact of domestic politics is also visible. Government parties have 
adopted neo-liberal low-road approaches which assume that any job is better 
than none, that low wages are acceptable and also promote privatisation and 
managerial approaches to manage the ‘stock’ of unemployment. Conservative 
ideologies feature and centre on various aspects of control, not least fiscal 
control but also fraud and behavioural controls, which tend to demonise the 
unemployed and single out lone parents. Social democratic logics are evident 
in the restoration of minimum wages and some labour protections as well as 
in the chosen model for employment services privatisation. Other social dem-
ocratic imperatives, in particular equality, universal services, decent jobs and 
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high participation are less visible or influential. Ireland was a slow moderniser 
in adopting such supply-side fundamentalism but crisis has occasioned a sig-
nificant shift in the orientation of Irish policy. As Bonoli (2013) anticipated, 
as a laggard Ireland has less institutional stickiness and adapted rapidly in the 
context of aid conditionality. Ireland’s experiment with marketisation and 
modernisation is leading towards quick convergence to European norms (Van 
Berkel et al., 2012). The impact of privatisation is potentially very signifi-
cant, opening the likelihood of greater managerialism.
The future is not yet clear but may mean profound shifts in rights and the 
concept of citizenship as well as shifts in power from both the state and non-
profit sectors towards market actors. Clasen and Clegg (2011) contrast coun-
tries in which policy adaptation has been constrained, hesitant and uneven to 
countries where activation policies are part of an unambiguous adaptation of 
labour market policies to the emergent post-industrial economy. Ireland was 
clearly part of the former hesitant group. Failure to achieve unemployment 
support homogenisation suggests ongoing adaptation will be ambiguous and 
uneven. The departure of the Troika makes domestic politics and tensions 
more visible and there are challenges for domestic politics in managing the 
post-Troika stages of reform. Thus far the Irish government, consistent with 
liberal states, is imposing policy rather than negotiating change through 
compromise. While the domestic agenda appears most driven by the power-
ful Christian Democratic led Department of an Taoiseach, the more minor 
social democratic partner is consistently on message with the ‘work-first’ 
philosophy. With these parties in power the control and sanctions driven 
agenda seems likely to intensify. However, activation also appears to be the 
only game in town. While many are critical of aspects of the policy, beyond 
rhetoric few alternative approaches are championed (Ingold and Etherington, 
2014). While a 2016 General Election may shift power, it is not clear how a 
new combination of political forces might shift the fundamental direction of 
activation policy. With unemployment just below 9 per cent and only one job 
vacancy for every 15 unemployed people, the issue to be resolved is still one 
of demand (NERI, 2015). As Grover (2009) has argued, governments need to 
focus less on supply and more on demand-side factors, on the quality of the 
jobs created, and on the barriers and discrimination people face when trying 
to access them. The Action Plan for Jobs (DJEI, 2015) has, to date, failed to 
focus on the quality of work and only in 2015 began to address the spatial dis-
tribution of employment. The Irish Low Pay Commission is an important ini-
tiative but needs stronger powers if it is to fulfil the uphill task of combating 
precarious working conditions and promoting decent work (ICTU, 2015).
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